Beyond the Air Domain: Battle Management in Space Operations

BY

BRANDON L. DAVENPORT, MAJOR, USAF

更多

A PAPER PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF

THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES

AIR UNIVERSITY

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

JUNE 2018

DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited.

收起

How to Fight and Win the Coming Space War

Paul S. Szymanski National@Policy.Space

November 12, 2020

Space Warfighting Culture: A White Paper

There has been a vigorous discussion and debate over the past several decades about whether our nation needs a separate military service for space. In December of 2019, a bipartisan majority in both houses of Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020 and the NDAA was signed into law on December 20, 2019.

更多

The Moorman Center for Space Studies, with input and guidance from the NSSA Membership and Board of Advisors, periodically publishes scholarly and position papers in an effort to advance national security space thought leadership and strengthen the national security space enterprise on the whole.

收起

A Framework of Deterrence in Space Operations

by Stephen J. Flanagan, Nicholas Martin, Alexis A. Blanc, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga

Over the past two decades, potential adversaries have developed a wide array of means to disrupt or deny the United States and its allies access to space capabilities that are essential to their security and military operations. This situation and deepening great-power tensions have given new urgency to understanding the counterspace strategies of potential adversaries and how they can be deterred from attacking U.S. and allied space assets or be dissuaded from even developing certain counterspace capabilities. There is no broadly agreed-on framework on the nature and requirements of deterrence in space operations. This report presents such a framework. The authors begin by identifying several foundational principles of deterrence and then consider what lessons pursuit of deterrence in other domains—nuclear and cyber—have for deterrence in space. They examine the nature and requirements of deterrence in the space domain, what constitutes success in space deterrence, what thresholds might lead to a failure of deterrence, and selected national approaches to space deterrence—by China, Russia, France, Japan, and India. Integrating all these components, the authors present three archetypes for space deterrence and consider questions about their application. They conclude that a comprehensive approach to space deterrence is likely to be most successful and should be tailored to address the distinct risk calculus and informational needs of various adversaries across the phases of conflict. Strategic messaging, selective revelation of space capabilities, and development of norms of responsible space behavior can also help deter attacks on space systems.

更多

Key Findings

There are several key elements of deterrence in space operations

Canonical strategies of deterrence by denial, deterrence by punishment, and some mix of the two are relevant to space deterrence.

Assurances, declaratory policy, dissuasion, and de-escalation also have utility in deterring or terminating counterspace actions.

Nuclear deterrence offers five central concepts relevant to deterrence in space: credibility, deterrence stability, the inversion of offense and defense, crisis stability, and escalation.

The challenges associated with deterring cyberattacks often parallel those for deterring space asset attacks: attribution, credibility, proportionality of response, and the ability to control escalation.

Various countries have quite different conceptions of space deterrence, including emphasis on defensive measures; reliance on preemptive, offensive attacks; and some mix of the two.

There are three archetypes for space deterrence

Denial dominant: This type of deterrence relies primarily on resilience, stealth capability, defensive measures, and redundancy to convince an adversary that it would be unable to achieve a decisive advantage by attacking the target country's space systems.

Mixed deterrence: This type of deterrence is achieved by a mix of resilience and defensive measures, combined with robust active defenses of space assets and more-substantial capabilities to degrade the space systems of other countries.

Offense dominant: This type of deterrence includes elements of denial and resilience but relies more on punishment. It places emphasis on a wide variety of counterspace weapons capable of severely degrading the space systems of other countries, possibly combined with the threat of debilitating responses in other domains.

Recommendations

Success in space deterrence should be measured along a spectrum that takes into account differing requirements for space services at various phases of a conflict and in light of how the conflict is unfolding in other domains.

The prospects for complete success in deterrence of hostile attacks on space assets, particularly reversible, nondestructive attacks, are limited.

Strategic messaging, deliberate revelation of selected space capabilities, and the development of international norms of responsible space behavior can enhance stability and deterrence in the space domain.

Because cyber and space attacks will likely have mostly material and economic effects rather than a human toll, threats to retaliate may be viewed as disproportionate, escalatory, and incredible. Responding to such attacks requires carefully calibrated retaliatory actions, though not necessarily in kind.

An effective space deterrence strategy should be tailored to address the distinct risk calculus of various adversaries across the phases of conflict (peacetime, competition, crisis, and conflict).

A comprehensive approach to space deterrence—one that seeks to regulate the use of force in space in the interest of stability; ostracizes states that violate agreed-on norms; and allows states to retain some capacity to punish space aggressors in multiple domains and to develop measures to enhance the defenses, resilience, and redundance of space systems—may have the greatest probability of success.

Table of Contents

Chapter One

Foundational Principles of Deterrence

Chapter Two

Lessons from Other Domains: Nuclear and Cyber

Chapter Three

Defining Success in Space Deterrence

Chapter Four

Framework for Deterrence in Space

收起

Combined Space Operations Vision 2031

DoD and Partners Release Combined Space Operations Vision 2031

FEB. 22, 2022

更多

The United States joins Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in the joint release of the “Combined Space Operations (CSpO) Vision 2031” today.

CSpO is an initiative to address the overarching need to encourage responsible use of space, recognizing challenges to space sustainability, threats presented by technological advances, and the increasingly comprehensive and aggressive counterspace programs of other nation states. The “CSpO Vision 2031” outlines the initiative’s overarching purpose and highlights its guiding principles, including: freedom of use of space, responsible and sustainable use of space, partnering while recognizing sovereignty, and upholding international law.

These guiding principles steer the initiative’s objectives and are supported by several lines of effort, from developing and operating resilient, interoperable architectures to fostering responsible military behaviors in space and sharing intelligence and information, all leading to the pursuit of a safe, secure, and sustainable space domain.

CSpO Principals last met in December 2021, reaffirming their nations’ support to the Vision, including the intent to prevent conflicts extending to or originating in space and to hold accountable those who threaten the safety of the space environment and the space assets of others. Representatives from the Department of Defense specifically addressed the importance of information sharing, leading to greater cooperation and interoperability, all key CSpO components.

收起

Driven by the business potentialities of the satellite industry, the last years witnessed a massive increase of attention in the space industry. This sector has been always considered critical by national entities and international organizations worldwide due to economic, cultural, scientific, military and civil implications. The need of cutting down satellite launch costs has become even more impellent due to the competition generated by the entrance in the sector of new players, including commercial organizations. Indeed, the high demand of satellite services requires affordable and flexible launch. In this context, a fundamental aspect is represented by the optimization of launch centers’ logistics. The aim of this paper is to investigate and review the benefits and potential impact that consolidated operations research and management strategies, coupled with emerging paradigms in machine learning and control can have in the satellite industry, surveying techniques which could be adopted in advanced operations management of satellite launch centers.

Introduction

General C. Robert Kehler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Senior Leader Perspective

更多

Building the Political Consensus to Deter Attacks on

Our Nation’s Space Systems

US Representative Terry Everett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Employing Elements of National Power in Schriever V

VADM Carl V. Mauney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Schriever V Wargames: The Boundaries of Space and Cyberspace

Lt Gen Larry D. James . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Schriever V - A UK Perspective

AVM T. M. “Timo” Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

A Space Doctrine for Soldier, Scientist, and Citizen: What It Will Take to

Secure the Space Domain

Ambassador Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Political-Military Implications of Space Warfare on Homeland Defense

and Allied Relations

BG Robert J. Felderman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Schriever V Wargame

The Value of the Domain

Col Robert F. Wright, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Coalition Space Operations: Lessons Learned from Schriever V Wargame

Mr. Joseph D. Rouge and Mr. Dennis L. Danielson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Schriever V: Lessons Learned - A Canadian Perspective

Col François Malo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Industry Perspective

The Strategic Value of Schriever V: Policy and Strategy Insights

for the Quadrennial Defense Review

Mr. Marc J. Berkowitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Schriever V: Managing and Understanding Consequences to Military Space

Maj Gen Franklin “Judd” Blaisdell, USAF, retired . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Historical Perspective

Schriever Wargames: The Battle for the Ultimate High Ground

Mr. James C. Mesco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Book Review

Wargaming for Leaders: Strategic Decision Making from the

Battlefield to the Boardroom

Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

收起

􀀁◆ Many weapons systems and most military operations require access to multiple domains. These linkages create vulnerabilities that actors can exploit by launching cross-domain attacks; the United States may seek to deter such attacks by threatening cross-domain responses. However, both the U.S. Government and potential adversaries lack a shared framework for analyzing how coun-terspace and cyber attacks fit into an accepted escalation ladder.

更多

􀀁◆ The real-world effects of attacks that strike targets in space and cyberspace and affect capabilities and events in other domains should be the basis for assessing their im-plications and determining whether responses in different domains are proportionate or escalatory.

􀀁◆ Development of a shared frame-work that integrates actions in the emerging strategic domains of space and cyberspace with actions in traditional domains would give decisionmakers a better sense

of which actions and responses are expected and accepted in real-world scenarios and which responses would be escalatory. This would support more coherent cross-domain contingency plan-ning within the U.S. Government and deterrence threats that poten-tial adversaries perceive as clearer and more credible.

收起