Understanding Deterrence

by Michael J. Mazarr

The challenge of deterrence — discouraging states from taking unwanted actions, especially military aggression — has again become a principal theme in U.S. defense policy. Because many potential adversaries are significantly more capable than they were a decade or more ago, moreover, the risks of actually fighting a major war are more significant than ever — making it even more imperative to deter conflict. Yet much of the emerging dialogue on deterrence remains characterized by unsupported assertions, claims that contradict the empirical record, and little reference to classic analyses. Meanwhile, changes in the international security environment have altered the context for deterrence, possibly challenging long-held assumptions and creating new requirements. This Perspective draws on a range of recent and classic RAND Corporation studies to revisit fundamental concepts and principles about deterrence. The most important overarching lesson of this review is that deterrence and dissuasion must be conceived primarily as an effort to shape the thinking of a potential aggressor. Any strategy to prevent aggression must begin with an assessment of the interests, motives, and imperatives of the potential aggressor, including its theory of deterrence (taking into account what it values and why). Deterrence turns out to be about much more than merely threatening a potential adversary: It demands the nuanced shaping of perceptions so that an adversary sees the alternatives to aggression as more attractive than war.

A Framework of Deterrence in Space Operations

by Stephen J. Flanagan, Nicholas Martin, Alexis A. Blanc, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga

Over the past two decades, potential adversaries have developed a wide array of means to disrupt or deny the United States and its allies access to space capabilities that are essential to their security and military operations. This situation and deepening great-power tensions have given new urgency to understanding the counterspace strategies of potential adversaries and how they can be deterred from attacking U.S. and allied space assets or be dissuaded from even developing certain counterspace capabilities. There is no broadly agreed-on framework on the nature and requirements of deterrence in space operations. This report presents such a framework. The authors begin by identifying several foundational principles of deterrence and then consider what lessons pursuit of deterrence in other domains—nuclear and cyber—have for deterrence in space. They examine the nature and requirements of deterrence in the space domain, what constitutes success in space deterrence, what thresholds might lead to a failure of deterrence, and selected national approaches to space deterrence—by China, Russia, France, Japan, and India. Integrating all these components, the authors present three archetypes for space deterrence and consider questions about their application. They conclude that a comprehensive approach to space deterrence is likely to be most successful and should be tailored to address the distinct risk calculus and informational needs of various adversaries across the phases of conflict. Strategic messaging, selective revelation of space capabilities, and development of norms of responsible space behavior can also help deter attacks on space systems.

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Key Findings

There are several key elements of deterrence in space operations

Canonical strategies of deterrence by denial, deterrence by punishment, and some mix of the two are relevant to space deterrence.

Assurances, declaratory policy, dissuasion, and de-escalation also have utility in deterring or terminating counterspace actions.

Nuclear deterrence offers five central concepts relevant to deterrence in space: credibility, deterrence stability, the inversion of offense and defense, crisis stability, and escalation.

The challenges associated with deterring cyberattacks often parallel those for deterring space asset attacks: attribution, credibility, proportionality of response, and the ability to control escalation.

Various countries have quite different conceptions of space deterrence, including emphasis on defensive measures; reliance on preemptive, offensive attacks; and some mix of the two.

There are three archetypes for space deterrence

Denial dominant: This type of deterrence relies primarily on resilience, stealth capability, defensive measures, and redundancy to convince an adversary that it would be unable to achieve a decisive advantage by attacking the target country's space systems.

Mixed deterrence: This type of deterrence is achieved by a mix of resilience and defensive measures, combined with robust active defenses of space assets and more-substantial capabilities to degrade the space systems of other countries.

Offense dominant: This type of deterrence includes elements of denial and resilience but relies more on punishment. It places emphasis on a wide variety of counterspace weapons capable of severely degrading the space systems of other countries, possibly combined with the threat of debilitating responses in other domains.

Recommendations

Success in space deterrence should be measured along a spectrum that takes into account differing requirements for space services at various phases of a conflict and in light of how the conflict is unfolding in other domains.

The prospects for complete success in deterrence of hostile attacks on space assets, particularly reversible, nondestructive attacks, are limited.

Strategic messaging, deliberate revelation of selected space capabilities, and the development of international norms of responsible space behavior can enhance stability and deterrence in the space domain.

Because cyber and space attacks will likely have mostly material and economic effects rather than a human toll, threats to retaliate may be viewed as disproportionate, escalatory, and incredible. Responding to such attacks requires carefully calibrated retaliatory actions, though not necessarily in kind.

An effective space deterrence strategy should be tailored to address the distinct risk calculus of various adversaries across the phases of conflict (peacetime, competition, crisis, and conflict).

A comprehensive approach to space deterrence—one that seeks to regulate the use of force in space in the interest of stability; ostracizes states that violate agreed-on norms; and allows states to retain some capacity to punish space aggressors in multiple domains and to develop measures to enhance the defenses, resilience, and redundance of space systems—may have the greatest probability of success.

Table of Contents

Chapter One

Foundational Principles of Deterrence

Chapter Two

Lessons from Other Domains: Nuclear and Cyber

Chapter Three

Defining Success in Space Deterrence

Chapter Four

Framework for Deterrence in Space

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Operationalizing Integrated Deterrence: Applying Joint Force Targeting across the Competition Continuum

Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.), Lt Col Justin M. Conelli, USAF,

Clementine G. Starling, and Julia Siegel

Integrated Deterrence and Cyberspace

Edited by Joseph L. Billingsley

Selected Essays Exploring the Role of Cyber Operations in the Pursuit of National Interest

Defense Frontiers

INTEGRATED DETERRENCE

Key to Free and Open Indo-Pacific

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VOLUME 47, ISSUE 2, 2022

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The Theater Army’s Central Role in Integrated Deterrence

Maj. Justin Magula, U.S. Army

Precision and Posture

Defense Spending Trends and the FY23 Budget Request

Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis

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NOVEMBER 2022

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Deterrence by Detection: A Key Role for Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Great Power Competition

April 14, 2020

Thomas G. Mahnken, Travis Sharp, Grace B. Kim

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In an era of renewed great power competition, one of the most significant challenges the United States and its allies face is the need to deny China or Russia the ability to launch opportunistic acts of aggression against an ally or partner in the Western Pacific or Eastern Europe. There is increasing concern among defense policymakers in the United States and its allies and partners that China and Russia are developing the ability to launch aggression rapidly against states on their periphery under the cover of increasingly capable reconnaissance-strike networks. With limited warning, Beijing or Moscow could exploit their time-distance advantage to seize allied territory before the United States and its allies could respond, thereby creating a fait accompli that would be difficult to reverse after the fact.

In CSBA’s latest study, Deterrence by Detection: A Key Role for Unmanned Systems in Great Power Competition, CSBA President and CEO Dr. Thomas G. Mahnken, Research Fellow Travis Sharp, and Senior Analyst Grace Kim propose a new operational concept to deter Chinese and Russian aggression, one that uses a network of existing non-stealthy long-endurance unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to maintain real-time, persistent situational awareness in key geographic areas in the Western Pacific and Eastern Europe. The authors argue that real-time situational awareness is critical to countering the twin challenges of sub-conventional gray zone aggres­sion and a conventional fait accompli gambit promptly and effectively.

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