Summary

This paper explores United States (U.S.) space policies and how they apply to satellite missions that may not fit the typical satellite mission mold. The paper presents a “roadmap” for policy compliance for satellites from diverse agencies and identifies areas where further work is underway to address the challenges posed by the evolution of the space industry. The paper lays out a coherent way forward for all small satellites navigating the approval quagmire, and for mission managers of multi-payload rideshares who wish to smooth the path to launch approval.

A Space Policy Primer: Key Concepts, Issues, And Actors

Introduction

New space policy questions are emerging, affecting both the traditional spacefaring nations and new entrants.

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At a time when plans are being made by the United States and others to return humans to the moon and eventually reach Mars while also exploring more distant worlds robotically, what should the overall goals of America’s civil space exploration program be, and what strategy is most conducive to achieving them? What role will international partners play in such endeavors? How best can civil and commercial space sectors work together in service of space science and exploration? And how best can the United States provide leadership in space traffic management (STM)?

The rapid transformation of the commercial space sector also drives a number of questions. Governments and their regulatory regimes struggle to keep up with the ever-increasing presence of private reusable rockets, large-scale constellations of satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO), in-space servicing, and potential asteroid mining. What domestic and international governance structures and internationally accepted guidelines, standards, and best practices need to be in place to prevent misunderstanding among nations and to protect the sustainability of the space environment? How can the interests of industry, free markets, and national security best be balanced when they are in opposition?

The United States national security space enterprise also faces numerous challenging questions. The increasing capability of rivals to threaten space assets and to exploit space for military advantage is being used to argue for more rapid development of more survivable space capabilities. Is the United States’ current military space acquisition system up to the task? How will the Space Force deter conflict in space and prepare for future wars in space if deterrence fails? And how should U.S. allies and partners share the burden of collective defense in space?

The U.S. military also plays a vital role in tracking space debris and monitoring traffic in space. As malevolent threats to U.S. national security space assets multiply, how will the military, the Department of Commerce, and commercial stakeholders contribute to space situational awareness (SSA) data-sharing and space traffic management (STM)? Will international actors buy into U.S. initiatives? Or will these issues be addressed internationally from a more bottom-up approach?

U.S. policymakers will need to address these questions while working with experts from across many fields, from many different government agencies and from many different countries and commercial enterprises. This primer provides some key concepts for categorizing and understanding space activities, provides an overview of international space law, and explains some common rationales that help justify the significant upfront investments required for space activities. It also provides a brief sketch of how the U.S. government is organized to address these difficult space policy questions. Ideally, this primer will provide the reader with the foundation upon which a comprehensive understanding of the complex issues surrounding U.S. national space policy may be built. More discussions about a variety of space policy topics can be found on the Center for Space Policy and Strategy homepage.*

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As space becomes more crowded and contested it becomes ever more important to prevent a conflict in, directed toward, or from space. Without any actual experience of combat in space, however, we can only speculate about what role the space domain might play in a breakdown of deterrence and the start of a war. This inexperience with space’s role in conflict complicates social science’s already limited understanding of how wars begin and unfold—with their complex interplay of political goals, differing levels of commitment, the friction generated in any actual fighting, and the inherently flawed people (on all sides) making decisions. As the strategic environment changes, we must explore ways to strengthen the contribution of U.S. military space capabilities to deterrence while also enhance any advantages should deterrence fail. Focusing on the credibility of U.S. space capabilities in some narrow areas reveals steps that could be made to strengthen their deterrent value.

Summary

As the United States and the world discuss the possibility of conflict extending into space, it is important to have a general understanding of what is physically possible and practical. Scenes from Star Wars, books, and TV shows portray a world very different from what we are likely to see in the next 50 years, if ever, given the laws of physics. To describe how physics constrains the space-to-space engagements of a conflict that extends into space, this paper lays out five key concepts: satellites move quickly, satellites move predictably, space is big, timing is everything, and satellites maneuver slowly. It is meant to be accessible to policymakers and decisionmakers, helping to frame discussions of space conflict. It does not explore geopolitical considerations.

Summary

This paper analyzes the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the United States Space Force approaches to digital engineering implementation along with an investigation of the possibilities for a more coordinated approach between the two. The potential advantages of a coordinated approach are discussed. Five inquiry-based evaluation criteria have been developed for application to four different approaches that might be embraced by the two organizations. A qualitative comparison of the four approaches is presented in the form of an analysis matrix and description. While the assessment does not reveal a clearly optimal path, the process informs the value of a coordinated approach over independent approaches.

Summary

United States national security is highly dependent on Department of Defense (DOD) space capabilities, which provide unique force-multiplying options to the joint warfighter, exclusive intelligence to national leadership, and potent economic benefits to all citizens. However, as remarkable and critical as these space capabilities may be, they exist within an inherently fragile and stovepiped architecture. Outdated capability development strategies have conspired with the complacent inertia of historical assumptions regarding the “sanctuary” nature of space to render the DOD space architecture vulnerable to a rapidly expanding arsenal of adversary threats. The result is that U.S. space capabilities—long a bastion of strength—have become an Achilles’ heel to America’s national security. This is a major reason why the United States Space Force (USSF) was established.

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Now the fledgling service faces a daunting task: It must not only organize, train, and equip space forces to deliver a host of critical capabilities to the warfighter and the nation, it must ensure those capabilities endure in an environment increasingly characterized by extreme complexity and uncertainty. In other words, the USSF must develop a more survivable, flexible, and interoperable space architecture. And it must do so quickly; potential adversaries are moving apace, determined to eclipse U.S. dominance of the space domain. Given the scope and nature of the challenge, it’s fair to question whether traditional DOD development and design methodologies are up to the task. What is desperately needed is a more nimble capability development methodology.

As noted in a previous paper by the author, the basis of such a nimble methodology may already exist. It is called Designing for Principles (DfP), and its name is derived from the fact that it emphasizes broad architectural principles of design—like survivability and flexibility—over traditional performance requirements. Furthermore, DfP thrives on uncertainty, favors strategic thinking, and prioritizes responsive speed above almost all else. It is perhaps an ideal match for the USSF to overcome its daunting task and exploit the opportunities unique to this moment. Whereas the previous paper described the general DfP approach to capability development, this paper provides specific recommendations on how the USSF can actually begin implementing DfP across the space enterprise.

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The United States has not fully leveraged its allies and defense partners in the space domain. This is partly due to significant obstacles, like classification and releasability, that have impeded more and deeper defense space partnerships. It also reflects the legacy of the Cold War, a period when space was dominated by a few major powers. A new space era is upon us. Allies and partners are developing significant space systems that can enhance U.S. capabilities. Concurrently, potential adversaries are developing weapons that could threaten U.S. and allied assets. The seriousness of the threat demands a more concerted and international approach. In this new space era, U.S. leadership should treat defense space partnerships as a strategic priority.

Summary

There is likely to be a surge of satellites launched into space over the next decade, which means the risk of collisions in space will rise along with risks to the sustainability of the space environment from debris. How can the sustainability of the space domain be protected in a looming new era of increasingly congested space? How can the international space community reduce these risks and make them more manageable? One vital method is for satellite owners and operators to voluntarily comply with the already internationally agreed-upon guideline to deorbit satellites no longer than 25 years after the end of their mission. This paper outlines five distinct concepts to incentivize compliance with the

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“25-year rule” and provides a framework for analyzing the merits of each concept. It focuses on commercial satellites in low Earth orbit but could be applied more broadly.

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