Global Horse Trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council

Axel Dreher§

Jan-Egbert Sturm‡

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James Raymond Vreeland†

This version: January 2009

Abstract

We investigate whether temporary members of the United Nations Security Council receive

favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) using panel data for 197

countries over the period from 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship

between temporary Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after

accounting for economic, political, and country-specific factors. There is also evidence that

Security Council membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. IMF

loans seem to be a mechanism by which the major shareholders of the Fund can win favor with

voting members of the Security Council.

Keywords: IMF, United Nations Security Council, Voting, Aid

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