The future of US policy toward China

Recommendations for the Biden administration

Ryan Hass, Ryan McElveen, and Robert D. Williams

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November 17, 2020

拜登政府上台前后，美国政界、学界纷纷行动起来，为“改朝换代”做准备，在各个领域出谋划策，对华政策自然是重点之一。 本文源于布鲁金斯学会“美国复兴与繁荣蓝图”（Brookings Blueprints for American Renewal & Prosperity project）项目。杜大伟与何瑞恩在项目中参与撰写了专刊《美国对华政策的未来：给拜登政府的建议》（The future of US policy toward China: Recommendations for the Biden administration），本文即取材于此。 布鲁金斯学会创建于1916年，是美国政界、学界最有影响力的智库之一，对于美国外交政策的研究者而言，其政策建议具有重要的参考价值。

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Bridging the internet-cyber gap: Digital policy lessons for the next administration

Cameron F. Kerry

OCTOBER 2016

The Department of State needs a cyber coordinator now more than ever

Cameron F. KerryFriday, July 28, 2017

Global manufacturing scorecard: How the US compares to 18 other nations

Darrell M. West and Christian LansangTuesday, July 10, 2018

Executive summary

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Manufacturing is enjoying a resurgence in the United States. After years of falling output and a diminishing percentage of the labor force, the last few years have seen renewed growth. According to PriceWaterhouseCoopers, the catalysts for this revival include factors such as the strengthening economy, workforce quality, tax policies, the regulatory environment, and transportation and energy costs.[1]

Yet in order to move forward, it is important to see how American manufacturing compares to that of other nations. In this report, we develop a global manufacturing scorecard that looks at five dimensions of the manufacturing environment: 1) overall policies and regulations; 2) tax policy; 3) energy, transportation, and health costs; 4) workforce quality; and 5) infrastructure and innovation.

For the analysis, we compiled data on 20 indicators and scored 19 leading nations on a 100-point scale. The countries analyzed included Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

The top ranked nations in overall manufacturing environment were the United Kingdom and Switzerland (both with 78 points out of 100), followed by the United States (77 points), Japan (74 points), and Canada (74 points). We found these nations performed well due to their policies, cost considerations, workforce investments, and infrastructure.

At the low end were nations such as Brazil (51 points), Indonesia (53 points), Mexico (56 points), Russia (56 points), and India (57 points). Generally, these places do not have advantageous tax policies and are not making adequate investments in education or infrastructure.

In addition, we compiled data on manufacturing output, manufacturing employment, and changes overtime. China is the top nation in terms of manufacturing output and the percentage of its national output that is generated by that sector. Poland meanwhile has the highest percentage of its workforce employed in manufacturing, followed by Germany, Italy, Turkey, and South Korea.

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PRESIDENTIAL OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE: THE CASE OF DONALD J. TRUMP

OCTOBER 10, 2017 BARRY H. BERKE, NOAH BOOKBINDER, AND NORMAN L. EISEN

Introduction

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On May 9, 2017, President Donald Trump fired FBI Director James Comey. Comey had been overseeing the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election, including possible collusion between Russia and the Trump campaign. The FBI was also investigating former National Security Advisor and Trump campaign adviser Michael Flynn, who failed to disclose communications with Russian officials and reportedly lied to Vice President Mike Pence about those communications.

President Trump’s firing of Comey and the subsequent revelations about President Trump’s earlier exchanges with Comey while he was FBI Director raise the question of whether President Trump obstructed justice by endeavoring to impede those investigations. In June, press reports indicated that Special Counsel Robert Mueller is indeed investigating the very question of whether President Trump obstructed justice.[1] Mueller has since impaneled a grand jury in Washington D.C., issued subpoenas, and has begun seeking interviews with current and former White House officials.[2]

In this paper, we break down and analyze the question of whether President Trump may have obstructed justice and explain the criminal and congressional actions that could follow from an obstruction investigation. Addressing the possibility of criminal behavior by President Trump and the complicated issues it raises is not a task that we take lightly. Dissecting allegations of criminality leveled against an individual who has been duly elected president and who has sworn to preserve, protect, and defend our Constitution is an inherently solemn task. But it is our hope that by presenting a rigorous legal analysis of the potential case against the president, we will help the American people and their representatives understand the contours of the issues, regardless of whether it is eventually litigated in a court of law, the halls of Congress, or the court of public opinion.

Our paper proceeds in four parts. In Section I, we summarize the relevant facts and allegations that can be gleaned from witness testimony and credible media reports. In Section II, we explain the law governing obstruction of justice and how it applies to the apparent facts and allegations as currently known. In Section III, we lay out the options available after Special Counsel Mueller has completed his investigation. These options include referral of the case to Congress, indictment of the president, holding the case pending removal of the president, and closing the case without indictment. Finally, in Section IV, we discuss the actions that Congress could take concurrently with or in addition to Mueller’s investigation. We explain that although Congress’s decision to take those steps is ultimately governed by both political and legal standards, there is precedent for impeaching a president on grounds that he has obstructed justice, obstructed a congressional investigation, or been convicted of a crime, should those circumstances arise.

We also have appended a number of documents that form the factual and legal basis for this white paper. Appendix A contains a factual chronology with the sources we relied on as well as a copy of former FBI Director James Comey’s statement for the record before the Senate Intelligence Committee. Appendix B contains copies of the federal obstruction laws and other relevant criminal statutes. Appendix C contains the authorities governing Special Counsel Mueller, including the Department of Justice’s special counsel regulations and the order defining his jurisdiction. Appendix D contains the articles of impeachment we discuss, official versions of which can be difficult to locate.

Finally, one crucial caveat that is important to note: the publication of this paper comes at a time when our understanding of the facts is still developing and without the benefit of the investigative tools that a prosecutor (or even a defense attorney) might employ. While we fully expect that our understanding of the facts relevant to this case will improve in the weeks and months ahead, we believe that the analysis we provide and the precedents we have collected will be relevant to the discussion regardless of what the investigations by Special Counsel Mueller and by Congress uncover.

美国布鲁金斯学会(Brookings Institution)周二发布分析报告称，特朗普(Donald Trump)解除前联邦调查局(Federal Bureau of Investigation , 简称FBI)局长科米(James Comey)职务的做法可能妨碍了司法，如果特别检查官穆勒(Robert Mueller)的调查得出相同结论，特朗普可能会面临弹劾。

这份长达108页的报告称，虽然特朗普在法律上有权解除科米的职务，但如果目的是干扰正在进行的俄罗斯干预美国大选的调查，就应另当别论。

布鲁金斯学会的报告称，事实和法律都让他们得出特朗普可能妨碍了司法的结论，如果这一结论得到证实，相信特朗普必须承担相应责任，毕竟任何人都不能凌驾于美国法律之上。

不过弹劾程序需要得到国会共和党人的支持，而共和党似乎不太可能弹劾特朗普。

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CONSTITUTION 3.0

Freedom and Technological Change

brookings institution press

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Washington, D.C.

Jeffrey Rosen

Benjamin Wittes

editors

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Localizing the Economic Impact of Research and Development: Policy Proposals for the Trump Administration and Congress

Stephen Ezell and Scott M. Andes

December 7, 2016

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Innovation drives countries’ long-term economic growth and improvements in quality of life. But the competition amongst nations for innovation leadership has intensified even as the increased complexity of technological innovation has made it more difficult to achieve. For these reasons, the federal government needs to step up its game when it comes to technology commercialization policies and programs.

If America is going to effectively compete with the world in the modern global innovation economy, it will need to do a better job of transforming knowledge into new companies and products here at home. Achieving this requires new policies that can help get technologies out of the laboratory and transfer them to market for commercialization by private-sector actors.

To help policymakers address these challenges, the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation and the Brookings Institution’s Bass Initiative on Innovation and Placemaking collaborated to propose 50 actions that the incoming Trump administration and new Congress can take to support tech transfer and commercialization nationwide. The paper’s recommendations range from prioritizing innovation districts in federal R&D outlays to implementing federal innovation vouchers to connect startups with research institutions.

The report’s 50 policy actions align with five major policy imperatives:

Strengthen innovation districts and regional technology clusters;

Bolster institutions supporting tech transfer, commercialization, and innovation;

Expand technology transfer and commercialization-related programs and investments;

Promote high-growth, tech-based entrepreneurship; and

Stimulate private-sector innovation.

The full list of policy actions is itemized below. Each is described in detail here.

Strengthen innovation districts and regional technology clusters

1. Prioritize innovation districts within federal R&D outlays

2. Task federal laboratories with a local economic development mission

3. Create off-campus “microlabs” to provide a front door to labs

4. Support technology clusters by assessing and managing local-level federal R&D investments

5. Assess federal real estate holdings and reallocate physical research assets to innovation districts

6. Allow labs to repurpose a small portion of existing funds for timely local collaboration

7. Standardize research partnership contracts within cities

8. Create NIH regional pre-competitive consortia to address national health concerns

9. Allow DOE labs to engage in non-federal funding partnerships that do not require DOE approval

10. Dismantle funding silos to support regional collaboration

11. Incentivize cross-purpose funding based on the economic strength of cities

12. Expand the national Regional Innovation Program

13. Support the innovation potential of rural areas

14. Facilitate regional makerspaces

15. Introduce an “Open Commercialization Infrastructure Act”

Bolster institutions supporting tech transfer, commercialization, and innovation

16. Establish a core of 20 “manufacturing universities”

17. Complete the buildout of Manufacturing USA to 45 Institutes of Manufacturing Innovation (IMIs)

18. Create a National Engineering and Innovation Foundation

19. Create an Office of Innovation Review within the Office of Management and Budget

20. Create a network of acquisition-oriented DoD labs based in regional technology clusters

21. Establish manufacturing development facilities

22. Establish a foundation for the national energy laboratories

Expand technology transfer and commercialization-related programs and investments

23. Increase the importance of commercialization activities at federal labs/research institutes

24. Allocate a share of federal funding to promote technology transfer and commercialization

25. Develop a proof-of-concept, or “Phase Zero,” individual and institutional grant award program within major federal research agencies

26. Fund pilot programs supporting experimental approaches to technology transfer and commercialization

27. Support university-based technology accelerators/incubators to commercialize faculty and student research

28. Allow a share of SBIR/STTR awards to be used for commercialization activities

29. Increase the allocation of federal agencies’ SBIR project budgets to commercialization activities

30. Modify the criteria and composition of SBIR review panels to make commercialization potential a more prominent factor in funding decisions

31. Encourage engagement of intermediary organizations in supporting the development of startups

32. Expand the NSF I-Corps program to additional federal agencies

33. Authorize and extend the Lab-Corps program

34. Provide federal matching funds for state and regional technology transfer and commercialization efforts

35. Incentivize universities to focus more on commercialization activities

36. Establish stronger university entrepreneurship metrics

37. Expand the collaborative R&D tax credit to spur research collaboration between industry and universities and labs

38. Increase funding for cooperative industry/university research programs at universities

39. Establish an International Patent Consortium

Promote high-growth, tech-based entrepreneurship

40. Encourage student entrepreneurship

41. Help nascent high-growth startups secure needed capital

42. Establish an entrepreneur-in-residence program with NIH

43. Implement immigration policies that advantage high-skill talent

44. Implement a research investor’s visa

Stimulate private-sector innovation

45. Implement innovation vouchers

46. Incentivize “megafunds” around high-risk research and development

47. Increase R&D tax credit generosity

48. Ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises are familiar with available R&D tax credits

49. Implement an innovation box to spur enterprises’ efforts to commercialize technologies

50. Revise the tax code to support innovation by research-intensive, pre-revenue companies

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Lessons from Germany

The Brookings Institution | Metropoli tan Poli cy Program | 2015 1

Global Cities Initiative

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A Joint Project of Brookings and JPMorgan Chase

Joseph Parilla, Jesus Leal Trujill o, and Alan Berube

Skills and Innovation

Strategies to Strengthen U.S. Manufacturing

Lessons from Germany

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