Why Peace Talks

Fail in Ukraine

Learning the Right Lessons From Three Years

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of Grinding War and Faltering Negotiations

Samuel Charap and Sergey Radchenko

May 8, 2025

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Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine

Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds

Royal United Services Institute

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for Defence and Security Studies

Special Report

19 May 2023

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Strelets (index 83t215i)

Reliable control is the key to success in battle

Evolution Not Revolution

Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

Stacie Pettyjohn

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FEBRUARY 2024

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Undermining Ukraine

How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine

Research coordinated by

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Edited by

ROMAN OSADCHUK

ANDY CARVIN

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Planning for the Aftermath

Assessing Options for U.S. Strategy Toward Russia After the Ukraine War

Published Feb 9, 2024

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by Samuel Charap, Miranda Priebe

U.S. policy choices made at the conclusions of past wars have had enduring consequences. Although there is no end in sight to the Russia-Ukraine war at the time of this writing in late 2023, U.S. policymakers should begin considering postwar Russia strategy now.

The authors of this report address this issue through an alternative futures analysis. Planning for after the war is complicated by significant uncertainty: Neither the conflict's trajectory nor the international climate at the war's end can be predicted with confidence. Given this uncertainty, the implications of U.S. strategic choices must be explored in different contexts. The authors develop two ideal-type postwar worlds, as defined by the outcome of the war and the character of the broader international environment: a less favorable world and a more favorable world. They also propose two ideal-type options for postwar U.S. strategy toward Russia, a hardline approach and a less hardline approach. Then, they consider how each strategy would play out in each world over the course of the decade after the war ends, yielding four alternative futures. They draw on the history of U.S.-Russia relations and the literatures on rivalries, interstate conflict, and alliances to assess the implications of each future for U.S. interests.

Key Findings

Wartime choices could shape the postwar world

Not taking these longer-term factors into consideration could lead to missed opportunities to shape the postwar environment.

The choices that will have to be made in the immediate aftermath of the war can have ripple effects on many long-term U.S. interests

These effects are not straightforward. Policymakers thus need time — long before the war ends — to consider these choices.

The United States may be able to influence the conflict outcome to promote its long-term postwar interests

The United States cannot determine the outcome of the war on its own; its decisions will never have the same impact as those of the two combatants. But Washington does have policy options to try to affect the trajectory of the conflict.

A longer, more violent war would lock in adverse consequences for U.S. interests

For example, a longer war could significantly undermine Ukraine's postwar recovery.

U.S. policy during and after the war can reduce the risk of Russia-Ukraine conflict recurrence

The United States has instruments to increase the likelihood that any peace endures.

Ramping up military pressure on Russia in Europe after the war could pose more risks than benefits

The war has weakened Russia and shown that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has a strong deterrent against Russian attacks on allies. Further forward deployments and other measures are likely unnecessary to deter opportunistic Russian aggression, but may make war by misperception about U.S. intentions more likely.

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The Day After

Postwar U.S. Strategy Toward Russia

Published Feb 9, 2024

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by Miranda Priebe, Samuel Charap

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Reconstructing Ukraine

Creating a Freer, More Prosperous, and Secure Future

by Howard J. Shatz, Gabrielle Tarini, Charles P. Ries, James Dobbins

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The post-war reconstruction effort in Ukraine might be the largest post-war rebuilding effort in modern history. Both the United States and Europe have begun to plan for Ukraine's success. The authors of this report examine previous post-war and post–natural disaster reform and reconstruction efforts to draw lessons and inform policymakers. They also discuss security arrangements, which will be essential for the success of reconstruction.

While reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan was more recent, Ukraine is fundamentally different. Instead, more-relevant lessons can be drawn from the truly transformative reform and reconstruction efforts in Western Europe following World War II, Central and Eastern Europe following the Cold War, and the Western Balkans following the wars in the former Yugoslavia. In all of these cases, the United States provided seed money and security, and the Europeans provided the bulk of the funding and advanced the process of European integration.

Key Findings

Ukraine's reconstruction and recovery should be a U.S.-Europe partnership

Reconstruction will be most successful if Ukraine sets the priorities, the United States leads on security assistance, and the European Union (EU) leads on reform and economic assistance, especially in light of Ukraine's potential EU accession. But both the United States and European countries will need to be involved with each.

Successful reconstruction will require strong linkages for international trade and investment, as well as a welcoming environment for international business.

To pay for reform and reconstruction, foreign government aid is needed; governments can fund higher-risk needs with conditionalities to ensure that Ukraine remains on the right track. But just as or more important, private financing and Ukraine's own resources are needed as well. Russia's international reserves — now frozen in the West — also could be an important source of funding.

Ukraine reconstruction will need a strong, trusted inspector general to safeguard the integrity of assistance, especially because of Ukraine's record of corruption since gaining independence in 1991.

Security is essential for Ukraine's reconstruction; without security, reconstruction will falter

Durable security arrangements supported by the West will help Ukraine deter and defend against future Russian attacks and will be critical if business and investments are to flow.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provided security for European reconstruction after World War II and the Cold War and deployed more than 100,000 peacekeepers to the Western Balkans after the break-up of Yugoslavia, enabling recovery.

Arrangements for Ukraine's security could take a variety of forms and might require new models beyond NATO membership.

While stronger measures of deterrence might make renewed fighting less likely, they could also raise Russia's threat perceptions, leading Moscow to take desperate measures.

Recommendations

U.S. policymakers need to carefully examine alternatives, both old and new, for Ukrainian security, and should engage with allies on this crucial and sensitive issue.

The administration and Congress should approve a modern version of the laws that enabled U.S. activities in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union after the Cold War — the Support for East European Democracy Act and the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act. This should include appointing an empowered coordinator to deal with Europe, international financial institutions, and Ukraine itself.

The entire future course of Ukraine reconstruction will benefit from the development and implementation of a bipartisan effort to explain and build support among the American people for a longer-term U.S. policy in Ukraine.

Table of Contents

Chapter One

Introduction

Chapter Two

Historical Perspectives on Reconstruction

Chapter Three

Lessons from Post–Natural Disaster Reconstruction Efforts

Chapter Four

Planning for Institutional Reform Beyond Infrastructure Repair

Chapter Five

Financing

Chapter Six

Organizing the Effort

Chapter Seven

Securing a Rebuilt Ukraine

Chapter Eight

A Freer, More Prosperous, and Secure Future for Ukraine and Its Partners

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