Institute for Defense Analyses4850 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882

Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM)

Brian S. Cohen

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703-845-6684, bcohen@ida.org

October 31, 2017

This material represents ongoing technical work and the views of the author and does not necessarily represent any policies or positions of the government

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON :

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

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Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i

97–497 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–63]

ASSESSING DOD’S ASSURED ACCESS

TO MICROELECTRONICS IN SUPPORT OF

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

OCTOBER 28, 2015

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A DARPA Approach to Trusted Microelectronics

To ensure the integrity of critical military systems, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5200.44 requires that DoD manage risks to the supply and security of certain microelectronic components. Under this Instruction, DoD must provide specific protections—including detecting, avoiding, and mitigating potential threats—based on a component’s military importance (criticality).1 The security environment is fluid, however. Variations in the use and importance of each device, changes in the supplier base, new adversary threats, and the availability of effective threat countermeasures each drive changes in DoD’s security needs. Further, no single security solution can provide complete protection for the full range of critical components. That level of protection will take a flexible, technologically-driven, portfolio-based approach to addressing the risks faced.

Acquisition & Technology

The Will to Change

Acquisition and Intelligence

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Community Collaboration

Kristen Baldwin

Deputy Director, Software Engineering and System Assurance

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense(Acquisition and Technology)

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THE GUIDEBOOK ON TRUST

HOW TO PROCURE TRUSTED ASICS FROM ACCREDITED SOURCES

DISCLAIMER: This Guidebook is intended to assist stakeholders seeking to understand implementation of the Trusted Accredited supplier program and is not a substitute for stakeholder’s seeking their own legal counsel to comply with legal requirements. Neither the TSSG nor its member companies are responsible for the interpretations expressed in this Guidebook.

National Computer Security Center

A Guide to Understanding Security Modeling in Trusted Systems

20010802 090

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October 1992

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RAISING THE BAR ON CYBERSECURITY AND ACQUISITION

Michael L. Papay

Frank J. Cilluffo

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Sharon L. Cardash

October 2014

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DoD TSN Update

2013/02/12 | Page-1 Distribution Statement A – Approved for public release by OSR on 02/06/13, SR Case # 13-S-1033 applies.

DoD Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN) Update

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Kristen Baldwin

Principal Deputy Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering, OUSD(AT&L)

NDIA Cyber Division Breakfast Meeting

February 12, 2013

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