Modernized Selected Acquisition Report (MSAR)

Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)

FY 2025 President Budget

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Effective: December 31, 2023

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A New Era in Air and Missile Defense:

IBCS and the Dawn of Integrated Fires and Effects

Christopher L. Spillman

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Brigadier General, U.S. Army (Retired)

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Strengthening the Phalanx: Layered, Comprehensive, and Distributed Air and Missile Defense in the Indo-Pacific

December 29, 2023 Carl Rehberg, Herbert Kemp

One of the most critical operational challenges the United States is likely to confront in a future conflict, particularly in the Indo-Pacific theater, is the threat of massed precision-guided air and missile attacks on overseas ports, bases, and other vital facilities. DoD has invested significant resources to defend against ballistic missile attacks on the United States, as well as its forward bases and forward-operating forces. However, it cannot still defeat large numbers of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems.

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Integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) plans still rely on defensive interceptors that cost too much, deliver too little, and do not sufficiently address the growing threat of complex salvo attacks.

Alternative approaches should include layered, comprehensive, and distributed IAMD concepts that address the full spectrum of threats. Specifically, new concepts should be built around concentric rings: an outer ring that can detect and engage hostile targets far beyond the range of ground-based defensive systems located at or near a threatened base; an inner ring that can protect the area immediately surrounding that base; and a close-in ring that provides point defense against specific targets on that base. This report develops such a concept and applies it to the defense of Guam.

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Moving Pieces: Near-Term Changes to Pacific Air Posture

November 18, 2022 Carl Rehberg, Josh Chang

The threat to U.S. and allied air facilities in the Indo-Pacific region is increasing. Current air force posture is vulnerable to adversary first strike due to insufficient posture resiliency—the ability of deployed forces to survive, operate, and regenerate under adversary attack. The recently announced decision to replace the permanent F-15C Eagle squadrons at Kadena Air Base with a rotational deployment only reduces the effectiveness of U.S. Indo-Pacific air forces in the event of a conflict. Defense planning in recent years has outlined recommendations to improve the defense of both facilities and others in the region, but these recommendations have only been partially implemented at best.

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In Moving Pieces: Near-Term Changes to Pacific Air Posture, authors Carl Rehberg and Josh Chang propose a new framework for air posture resilience in the Indo-Pacific theater. Rehberg and Chang use Okinawa and Guam as case studies for this new framework, analyzing recent plans and implemented changes to posture on both islands and their current force posture. They then recommend a series of options the U.S. can implement by 2030. Although posture resiliency must constitute the right mix of passive and active defenses, it also requires more emphasis on an understudied element to enhance the survivability of force posture in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command: force structure capabilities for counterstrike. Force posture and posture resiliency call for bold leadership from DoD et al. to implement and accelerate meaningful options now and in the near term to enhance crisis and structural stability. These options will assure U.S. allies and partners, deters adversaries, focus on operational plan execution, and improve warfighting effectiveness. The time to act is now.

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Five Priorities for the Air Force’s Future Combat Air Force

January 22, 2020 Mark Gunzinger, Carl Rehberg, Lukas Autenried

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls for increasing the capacity, lethality, and survivability of the joint force in future contested threat environments. CSBA’s report recommends five priorities for the USAF’s combat air force (CAF) that support these objectives. In addition to growing the size of the CAF to support future combatant commander requirements, the report recommends the Air Force accelerate its acquisition of stealth F-35As, procure a larger overall inventory of next-generation B-21 bombers, and field unmanned aircraft and weapons that would increase the CAF’s survivability and ability to operate over long ranges. The report also recommends the Air Force maintain its ability to generate combat sorties from increasingly resilient basing postures in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Doing so will require the Air Force to rapidly disperse its forward combat air forces, counter missile attacks on its theater operating locations, and reduce its reliance on vulnerable theater runways and base infrastructure. The report concludes additional resources, including a significant increase in acquisition funding over the next decade, is needed to address the growing gap between the Air Force’s combat capabilities and requirements of the 2018 NDS.

An Air Force for an Era of Great Power Competition

March 29, 2019 Mark Gunzinger, Carl Rehberg, Jacob Cohn, Timothy A. Walton, Lukas Autenried

The report summarizes insights and recommendations developed during a CSBA study of the U.S. Air Force's future aircraft inventory. As required by the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, the report proposes a force planning construct and associated force structure necessary for the United States to support the 2018 National Defense Strategy. This construct would require the Air Force to size and shape its future force to sustain strategic deterrence, defend the U.S. homeland, and be prepared to defeat major acts of aggression by China and Russia as part of the Joint Force.

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The report recommends creating a future aircraft inventory that would be more lethal and better able to operate in future contested and highly contested environments compared to today's force. It also advises the U.S. Air Force to develop and field this force over the next fifteen to twenty years instead of attempting to reach a specific inventory target by 2030.

Significantly increasing the size of the Air Force's aircraft inventory to reach an objective force by 2030 would require it primarily to procure aircraft that are in production now or are about to enter production. This could reduce funding to develop new weapon systems and create significant gaps in capabilities that would be needed beyond 2030.

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Air and Missile Defense at a Crossroads: New Concepts and Technologies to Defend America’s Overseas Bases

October 3, 2018 Mark Gunzinger, Carl Rehberg

Mark Gunzinger and Carl Rehberg address how DoD could take advantage of mature technologies to develop higher capacity and more cost-effective air and missile defenses for its overseas bases. It assesses the potential for a layered, distributed defense that integrates multiple new non-kinetic and kinetic systems to defeat salvo attacks.

Air and Missile Defense at a Crossroads: New Concepts and Technologies to Defend America’s Overseas Bases

October 3, 2018 Mark Gunzinger, Carl Rehberg

Mark Gunzinger and Carl Rehberg address how DoD could take advantage of mature technologies to develop higher capacity and more cost-effective air and missile defenses for its overseas bases. It assesses the potential for a layered, distributed defense that integrates multiple new non-kinetic and kinetic systems to defeat salvo attacks.