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DOD Continuing to Develop New Jam-Resistant Capability, But Widespread Use Remains Years Away

Report to Congressional Committees

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January 2021

GAO-21-145

United States Government Accountability Office

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22 | FY 2023 Top DoD Management Challenges

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE │ OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

4800 Mark Center Drive

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Alexandria, Virginia 22350‑1500

www.dodig.mil

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U.S. Space Command:

Air Force Should Develop Guidance for Strengthening Future Basing Decisions

GAO-22-106055

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We reviewed the Air Force's process for identifying the preferred location for U.S. Space Command headquarters.

We assessed the process against 21 "Analysis of Alternatives" best practices, which can help increase transparency and avoid the presence or appearance of bias.

The practices are grouped into four characteristics of a high-quality analysis: comprehensive, well-documented, unbiased, and credible. We found that the Air Force's process did not substantially meet 3 of these 4 characteristics—leading to significant shortfalls in its transparency and credibility.

We recommended establishing guidance that incorporates our best practices.

From December 2018 through early March 2020, the Air Force largely followed its established strategic basing process to determine the preferred location for U.S. Space Command headquarters. From early March 2020 through January 2021, the Air Force implemented a revised, three-phased process at the direction of the then Secretary of Defense, culminating in the selection of Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama as the preferred location. The revised process followed some elements of the established basing process, but included different steps. For example, in its revised process, the Air Force solicited nominations from all 50 states instead of beginning with a set of candidates based on their respective ability to meet defined functional requirements.

GAO found that the Air Force's revised process fully or substantially met 7 of 21 Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) best practices it assessed. These best practices are grouped into four characteristics of a high-quality AOA process. GAO found that the revised process did not fully or substantially meet 3 of 4 characteristics.

Assessment of the Air Force's Revised Process for U.S. Space Command Basing against GAO's Four Characteristics of an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) Process

Assessment of the Air Force's Revised Process for U.S. Space Command Basing against GAO's Four Characteristics of an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) Process

Note: Characteristic ratings are the average of individual best practice scores. For best practices, Not Met = 1, Minimally Met = 2, Partially Met =3, Substantially Met = 4, and Fully Met = 5. For characteristics, Not Met = 1.0 to 1.4, Minimally Met = 1.5 to 2.4, Partially Met = 2.5 to 3.4, Substantially Met = 3.5 to 4.4, and Fully Met = 4.5 to 5.0.

Air Force officials told GAO they did not use the AOA best practices as a guide during the revised process because the practices were not required or relevant to basing decisions. However, GAO believes that the AOA best practices are relevant and, if effectively implemented, can help ensure such basing decisions are transparent and deliberate. Developing basing guidance consistent with these best practices, and determining the basing actions to which it should apply, would better position the Air Force to substantiate future basing decisions and help prevent bias, or the appearance of bias, from undermining their credibility.

Why GAO Did This Study

The then President directed the establishment of U.S. Space Command in December 2018. The Department of Defense (DOD) views the advent of U.S. Space Command as a critical step to accelerate the nation's ability to defend its vital interests and deter adversaries in space. U.S. Space Command is responsible for planning and executing offensive and defensive space operations with the military services, other combatant commands, DOD agencies, and other partners.

GAO was asked to review the Air Force's process and methodology to select the permanent location for U.S. Space Command headquarters. This report (1) examines how the U.S. Space Command basing process compared with the established Air Force basing process and describes the steps the Air Force took to identify a headquarters location, and (2) evaluates the extent to which the Air Force's revised selection process for determining the U.S. Space Command headquarters conformed to GAO best practices for analyzing alternatives.

GAO reviewed documentation, interviewed knowledgeable officials, and assessed related information using GAO's best practices for a high-quality AOA process. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in May 2022. Information that DOD has deemed sensitive has been omitted.

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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter:

Cost Growth and Schedule Delays Continue

GAO-22-105128

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Operational testing of the F-35 continues to be delayed—primarily by holdups in developing an aircraft simulator—even as DOD goes forward with the purchase of up to 152 aircraft a year. The more aircraft produced before testing is complete, the more it might cost to retrofit those aircraft if issues are discovered.

If DOD moves forward as planned, it will have bought a third of all F-35s before determining that the aircraft is ready to move into the full-rate production phase.

This report also provides an update on the F-35 modernization effort, which is delayed by 4 years. DOD continues to address related concerns we (and others) have raised.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has not yet authorized the F-35 program to begin full-rate production. Full-rate production generally is the point when a program has demonstrated an acceptable level of performance and reliability; and in the case of the F-35, is ready for higher manufacturing rates. The delay in reaching this milestone stems largely from problems and delays developing the F-35 simulator, needed for crucial testing. The program is projected to finalize its schedule in spring 2022. As a result, the date for the full-rate production decision remains undetermined at this time. Despite this delayed decision, DOD is planning on acquiring up to 152 aircraft per year. At that rate, DOD would purchase about one-third of all planned F-35 aircraft before achieving this production milestone, which increases risk. For example, it means that more aircraft will need to be fixed later if more performance issues are identified, which will cost more than if those issues were resolved before those aircraft were produced. At the same time that DOD is purchasing aircraft at these high rates, those that are already in the fleet are not performing as well as expected.

DOD is also 4 years into development of its modernization effort, known as Block 4, which is continuing to experience cost growth and schedule delays. Block 4 costs continued to rise during 2021 due to higher costs associated with upgrading crucial hardware and testing upgrades, among other things. The program office extended Block 4 development and delivery into fiscal year 2029—which is now 3 years beyond the original plan (see figure). To avoid further delays, the program office is taking steps to improve the timeliness and quality of software deliveries, but it is too soon to tell whether these actions will result in improved outcomes for Block 4.

The F-35 program office has changed plans from replacing its logistics system and is now taking incremental steps to improve and modernize it. The Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) has faced long-standing challenges, including technical complexity, poor usability, and inaccurate or missing data. Initially, the F-35 program intended to develop a new system to replace ALIS. However, the program office now plans to make gradual improvements to ALIS and eventually rename it. These planned improvements include smaller hardware and improved program data access. The program has yet to identify a date for when it will consider this transition complete but has mapped out the improvements it intends to make over the next 3 years.

Why GAO Did This Study

The F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter program remains DOD's most expensive weapon system program. It is estimated to cost over $1.7 trillion to buy, operate, and sustain. DOD is 4 years into a development effort to modernize the F-35 aircraft's capabilities. An important element to operating and maintaining the F-35 is a complex logistics system called ALIS. In 2020, DOD began an effort to improve ALIS after years of concerns regarding its performance. Congress included provisions in two statutes for GAO to review the F-35 program.

This report (1) identifies the F-35's progress towards full-rate production, (2) addresses the program's progress and improvements towards developing, testing, and delivering modernization capabilities, and (3) describes DOD's plan for improving its logistics system. To assess progress for the F-35 and its modernization program, GAO compared the cost and schedule targets in the original development program documentation to the most recent data available. GAO also reviewed DOD and contractor documentation and interviewed DOD officials and contractor representatives.

Since 2001, GAO has made a number of recommendations to DOD to improve aspects of the acquisition of F-35 aircraft. In 2020, GAO recommended DOD develop a strategy for its logistics system redesign. In 2021, GAO made 3 recommendations aimed at improving Block 4. DOD concurred with these recommendations and has addressed or is taking steps to address them.

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