Global Counterspace Capabilities Report 2022 Executive Summary

Space security has become an increasingly salient policy issue. Over the last several years, there has been growing concern from multiple governments over the reliance on vulnerable space capabilities for national security, and the corresponding proliferation of offensive counterspace capabilities that could be used to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy space systems. This in turn has led to increased rhetoric from some countries about the need to prepare for future conflicts on Earth to extend into space, and calls from some corners to increase the development of offensive counterspace capabilities and put in place more aggressive policies and postures.

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We feel strongly that a more open and public debate on these issues is urgently needed. Space is not the sole domain of militaries and intelligence services. Our global society and economy is increasingly dependent on space capabilities, and a future conflict in space could have massive, long-term negative repercussions that are felt here on Earth. Even testing of these capabilities could have long-lasting negative repercussions for the space environment, and all who operate there. The public should be as aware of the developing threats and risks of different policy options as would be the case for other national security issues in the air, land, and sea domains.

The 2022 Report

The 2022 edition of the report adds new developments through February 2022, adds three new countries to the report (Australia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom), and reorganizes the report to highlight those countries that have created orbital debris through counterspace testing.

Major Updates in 2022:

Added historical U.S. ASAT programs (NOTSNIK, Satellite Interceptor Program, HiHo)

Added details on cannons and missile defenses intended for the Soviet Almaz military space stations

Additional movements of the US PAN and GSSAP satellites and the Russian Luch/Olymp-K satellite in the GEO belt

China using their SJ-21 removing a defunct Beidou satellite from GEO

New reports of GPS interference in Cyprus and Crimea

Deployment and use of electronic warfare (EW) capabilities in Ukraine

France's first military space exercise, ASTERX

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SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION GLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES

APRIL 2021 1

Editors

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Brian Weeden

Director Of Program Planning

Victoria Samson

Washington Office Director

GLOBAL

COUNTERSPACE

CAPABILITIES

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AN OPEN SOURCE ASSESSMENT

APRIL 2021

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2021年4月1

安全世界基金会 全球反太空能力

编者

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布莱恩·威登 (Brian Weeden)

项目规划主任

维多利亚·萨姆森 (Victoria Samson)

华盛顿办事处主任

全球反太空能力

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开源评估

2021年4月

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Global Countersp ace Capabilities:

An Open Source Assessment

April 2020

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Editors

Brian Weeden

Director of Program Planning

Victoria Samson

Washington Office Director

Global Counterspace Capabilities

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Global Counterspace Capabilities:

An Open Source Assessment

April 2019

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Promoting Cooperative Solutions for Space Sustainability

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全球反太空技术2022

Global Counterspace Capabilities Report 2022

Space security has become an increasingly salient policy issue. Over the last several years, there has been growing concern from multiple governments over the reliance on vulnerable space capabilities for national security, and the corresponding proliferation of offensive counterspace capabilities that could be used to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy space systems. This in turn has led to increased rhetoric from some countries about the need to prepare for future conflicts on Earth to extend into space, and calls from some corners to increase the development of offensive counterspace capabilities and put in place more aggressive policies and postures.

更多

We feel strongly that a more open and public debate on these issues is urgently needed. Space is not the sole domain of militaries and intelligence services. Our global society and economy is increasingly dependent on space capabilities, and a future conflict in space could have massive, long-term negative repercussions that are felt here on Earth. Even testing of these capabilities could have long-lasting negative repercussions for the space environment, and all who operate there. The public should be as aware of the developing threats and risks of different policy options as would be the case for other national security issues in the air, land, and sea domains.

The 2022 Report

The 2022 edition of the report adds new developments through February 2022, adds three new countries to the report (Australia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom), and reorganizes the report to highlight those countries that have created orbital debris through counterspace testing.

Major Updates in 2022:

Added historical U.S. ASAT programs (NOTSNIK, Satellite Interceptor Program, HiHo)

Added details on cannons and missile defenses intended for the Soviet Almaz military space stations

Additional movements of the US PAN and GSSAP satellites and the Russian Luch/Olymp-K satellite in the GEO belt

China using their SJ-21 removing a defunct Beidou satellite from GEO

New reports of GPS interference in Cyprus and Crimea

Deployment and use of electronic warfare (EW) capabilities in Ukraine

France's first military space exercise, ASTERX

收起

Global Counterspace Capabilities:

An Open Source Assessment

April 2020

更多

Editors

Brian Weeden

Director of Program Planning

Victoria Samson

Washington Office Director

收起

Global Counterspace Capabilities 2019